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Abstract
This paper presents a New Keynesian model characterized by labor
indivisibilities, unemployment and a unionized labor market. The bar-
gaining process between unions and rms introduces real wage rigidity
and creates an endogenous trade-o¤ between ination and output sta-
bilization. Under an optimal discretionary monetary policy a negative
productivity shock requires an increase in the nominal interest rate.
Moreover, an operational instrument rule will satisfy the Taylor prin-
ciple, but will also require that the nominal interest rate does not
necessarily respond one to one to an increase in the e¢ cient rate of
interest. The model calibration studies the response of the unionzed
economy to productivity shocks under di¤erent monetary policy rules.
1 Introduction
In the last ten years, the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium New
Keynesian (DSGE-NK henceforth) model has emerged as an important par-
adigm in macroeconomics and as a useful framework for the study of mone-
tary policy. Most of the models proposed so far, however, completely ignore
the role that trade unions play in determining wages and employment con-
ditions in many countries. If this is probably an acceptable (although very
strong) simplication for countries, like the U.S. where, in the year 2002,
only about 15% of workers were covered by collective contract agreements,
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it becomes instead problematic for other countries such as France, Italy or
Sweden where the percentage of workers covered by collective contracts is
above 84%.1 Given that wage bargaining may introduce signicant distor-
tions in the functioning of a modern economy and have an impact on its
behavior at the aggregate level, the study of unionized labor markets and
of the consequences of these markets for monetary policy becomes of crucial
importance if one wants to understand the functioning of many important
economies around the world.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a model where i) movements
of the rate of unemployment are explicitly accounted for; ii) wages are the
result of a contractual process between unions and rms. We accomplish the
rst aim by assuming, as in Hansen [35] and Rogerson and Wright [46], that
labor supply is indivisible and that workers face a positive probability of
remaining unemployed. We deal with the second problem by assuming that
wages are set by unions according to the popular monopoly-union model
introduced by Dunlop [19] and Oswald [41].
Unions, in our paper, do not simply maximize the utility of their mem-
bers, but are institutions that also have "political" objectives in the sense
that their objective function takes into account the preferences of workers,
the preferences of leaders and market constraints. In this respect we take
side on the old and never settled debate initiated by Dunlop [19] and Ross
[48] over the appropriate maximand for the unionsutility function, and we
assume that the unionsobjective function is a Stone-Geary utility function
as in Dertouzos and Pencavel [17], Pencavel [42] and, more recently, by De
la Croix et al. [16], Raurich and Sorolla [45] and by Chang et al. [10]. This
function is extremely exible and, depending on parameter values, allows
for di¤erent distribution of power, inside the union, between members and
leaders who may have diverging objectives. Moreover, the fact that unions
maximize such a function, which includes among its arguments the actual
real wage, the reservation wage as well as the level of employment, allows us
to introduce real wage rigidity in the model. This distortion is actually the
result of the divergence between the unions objective and the households
utility function: a union that simply maximized a utility function would
simply set the real wage as a constant mark-up over the competitive wage,
in which case the real wage would be fully exible.
The papers that are closest to this one are the RBC model by Ma¤ezzoli
[39] and the New Keynesian model proposed by Zanetti [58].2 Other models
1More precisely, the number of persons covered by collective agreeements over total
employment was 94.5% in France in 2003, 84.1% in Italy in the year 2000 and 85.1% in
Sweden in the year 2000. For a complete set of data on union coverage on the various
countries see Lawrence and Ishikawa [37].
2Both Ma¤ezzoli [39] and Zanetti [58] assume that unions simply maximize a risk
neutral utility function, which is a special case of the more general unions objective
function we consider in this paper.
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characterized by labor market frictions and price staggering, where labor is
allowed to move not only along the intensive margin but also along extensive
margin, have been proposed also, by Chéron and Langot [11], Walsh [54]
[55], Trigari [53], Moyen and Sahuc [40] and Andres et al. [2]. All these
models show that search and matching frictions improve the ability of the
standard New Keynesian model to replicate the dynamics of ination and
unemployment by explaining, in particular, the persistence of output and
the sluggishness of ination. More recently Christo¤el and Linzert [14] and
Blanchard and Galì [6] [7] have proposed models characterized by both labor
market frictions and real wage rigidities. Blanchard and Galì [6] show that,
if real wages are assumed to adjust slowly, what they dene as the divine
coincidence does not hold any more: for a central bank pursuing, as a
policy objective, the level of output that would prevail under exible prices
is not equivalent to pursuing the e¢ cient level of output, in which case a
trade-o¤ between ination stabilization and output gap stabilization arises.
Blanchard and Galì [7] use a model with search and matching frictions and
sluggish real wages, and show that a policy trade-o¤ does not only pertain
to the output gap, but also to the rate of unemployment.
Our model di¤ers from previous studies in several respects. First, as in
Zanetti [58] we abstract from the search and matching frictions based on the
Mortensen-Pissarides [43] model, and we concentrate on the consequences
of union behavior, studying in particular the implications of microfounded
real wage rigidities. An important aspect of our framework with labor in-
divisibilities is that wage rigidities apply also to ongoing relationships and
not only to new hirings, a problem that is usually found when wage rigidi-
ties are introduced in models with search and matching frictions (see for
example Thomas [52]). Moreover, di¤erently from Zanetti, we propose a
simpler model without human and physical capital accumulation and we
are able, therefore, to study analytically the optimal interest rate rule a
Central Bank should implement in our unionized economy.3 Morever, by
assuming Rogerson and Wright [46] indivisible labor model, we are able to
analyze unemployment in a simple and tractable way which allows us to es-
tablish an inverse relationship between unemployment and the output gap.
The model is capable of producing a series of interesting results.
First, it shows that productivity shocks and reservation wage shocks give
rise to a signicant policy trade-o¤ between stabilizing ination and stabi-
lizing unemployment, and in this respect it provides a way to overcome an
important shortcoming of the NK model, i.e. its inability to account for
the signicant challenges that exogenous changes in technology represent
for monetary policy in the real world. According to the standard NK
3As we will show in the calibration section, the introduction of phisycal capital does
not change the qualitative dynamics of our model. If we calibrate the model using the
Taylor-type rule assumed by Zanetti [58] we show that our impulse response functions are
very similar to the ones obtained by this author.
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model, in fact, an optimal monetary policy that stabilizes output around its
exible price equilibrium also produces zero ination,4 so that stabilizing
ination implies automatically an optimal response to a productivity shock.
This, however, not only is at odds with the historical accounts5 and the
widespread perception of nancial markets, but there is also some recent
empirical evidence indicating that, in most countries, central banks have ac-
tively responded to technology shocks, increasing or decreasing the nominal
interest rate.6 What is interesting, in our model, is that this result is not the
consequence of some kind of exogenous real wage inertia, as in Blanchard
and Galì [6], but is simply the consequence of monopolistic unions pursuing
a well dened contractual strategy in the labor market. In our economy, in
fact, a productivity slowdown, i.e. a negative productivity shock, tends to
lower e¢ cient output but, since unions will keep real wages constant, the
level of output that would prevail under price exibility (that we dene as
naturaloutput) decreases even more, so that the di¤erence between e¢ -
cient output and natural output increases. Since in sticky price models
ination depends on marginal costs and, in turn, marginal costs depend on
the di¤erence between naturaloutput and actual output, then a Phillips
curve, correctly dened as depending on the gap between e¢ cient output
and actual output, will depend on productivity shocks, and a trade-o¤ be-
tween ination stabilization and output gap stabilization arises.
Second, we show that a policy trade-o¤ for the central bank arises not
only in response to technology shocks, but also in response to exogenous
wage push shocks. If the unionsreservation wage is subject to exogenous
changes, and these changes tend to be persistent over time, then a wel-
fare maximizing central bank must again face the problem of whether to
accommodate these shocks with a easier monetary policy. Our model there-
fore provides a convenient framework to address important normative issues
such as, for example, the optimal behavior of central banks in periods char-
acterized by labor market turmoil and wage shocks.
4This is shown quite clearly, for example, by Galì, Lopez Salido and Valles [25].
5There is a lot of anectodical evidence that the Fed has spent large e¤orts in under-
standing the increase in productivity growth that has characterized the American economy
since the mid 1990s. The success of monetary policy in this period has been attributed by
important commentators to the ability of the Fed to respond to exogenous technological
progress.
6Galì et al. [24] found that the Fed, in the post-Volcker period, did not change the
nominal interest rate in response to productivity shocks. In a recent paper, Francis,
Owyang and Theodoru [22] analyze monetary policy for the G7 countries and found a
wide range of variation in the behavior of di¤erent countries: while France, Japan, the
United Kingdom (after the break in monetary regime) seem to have reacted to a technology
shock by increasing nominal interest rates, the U.S. (before and after Vocker), Canada,
Germany, the U.K (pre-break) and Italy, seem to have reacted instead by lowering interest
rates. A policy of no-reaction to a productivity shock consistent with the prescriptions of
the standard DSGE-New Keynesian model, therefore, does not seem to have been widely
adopted by the major industrialized countries.
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Third, we are able to derive, also in a model with non separable utility
and indivisible labor, the objective function of the central bank as a second
order Taylor approximation of the expected utility of the representative
household, and we show that, when the economy is hit by technology and
wage shocks, monetary policy presents some interesting peculiarities relative
to the standard case. An optimal discretionary policy requires an increase
in the interest rate following a negative productivity shock and an increase
in the interest rate following a positive reservation wage shock. An optimal
instrument rule that implements such policy can be expressed as an interest
rate reacting to the expected rate of ination and to the e¢ cient rate of
interest. In this model monetary policy satises the Taylor principle, i.e.
the nominal interest rate must be raised more than proportionally with
respect to the expected rate of ination. The response of the nominal interest
rate to the e¢ cient rate of interest, however, is not one to one like in
the standard model: if the persistence of the technological shock is greater
than the persistence of the reservation wage shock, the nominal interest rate
will increase less than proportionately to an increase in the e¢ cient rate of
interest. This is due to the fact, unlike what happens in the standard model,
the central bank must react, at the same time, both to a technology shock
and to a reservation wage shock.
A fourth, important result is that the model is able to account for a well
known stylized fact in macroeconomics, i.e. the relatively smooth behavior of
wages and the relatively volatile behavior of unemployment over the business
cycle. When the level of unemployment that the economy achieves under an
optimal discretionary policy is written as a function of the relevant shocks,
an exogenous wage shock will in general induce a movement both in the
real wage and in the rate of unemployment; a productivity shock, instead,
will induce a movement in the rate of unemployment, but not in the real
wage. An economy frequently hit by exogenous changes in technology will
show, therefore, a strong variability in the rate of unemployment without
experiencing, at the same time, signicant movements in the real wage.7
Finally, the model is calibrated to the Euro area quarterly data. We
start by comparing our economy characterized by staggered prices and real
wage rigidity with an economy characterized by exible prices and real wage
rigidity under the interest rate rule estimated by Smets and Wouters [57].
This allows us to understand better which is the role of real wage rigidity in
the transmission of monetary policy. We then compare the dynamics of the
unionized economy with the dynamics of an economy with a walrasian labor
market. We nd that the response of the relevant variables to a productivity
shock is usually larger and more persistent in the unionized economy than
7Also Gertler and Trigari [32] propose a model where wages and unemployment move
consistently with the observed data. They achieve this result, however, by introducing
exogenous multiperiod wage contracts.
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in the one characterized by walrasian labor markets. One important result
arising from the calibration exercise is that when the central bank utilizes
the Smets and Wouters [57] interest rate rule the model is consistent with
the positive correlation between technology shocks and the labor input found
in the data. An interest rate rule that replicates the optimal one, moreover,
implies a larger response to ination and a smaller response to the output
gap than the one usually implied by standard Taylor-type rules.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the standard
indivisible labor model (hereafter, IL model). In Section 3 we develop the
monopoly union model (hereafter, MU model). In Section 4 we study opti-
mal monetary policy in the MU model. The model is calibrated in section
5.
2 The Indivisible Labor Model
2.1 Households
We consider an economy populated by many identical, innitely lived
worker-households each of measure zero. Households demand a Dixit, Stiglitz
[18] composite consumption bundle produced by a continuum of monopo-
listically competitive rms. In each period households sell labor services to
rms. As in Hansen [35], Rogerson [46] and Rogerson and Wright [47], for
each household the alternative is between working a xed number of hours
and not working at all. We assume that agents enter employment lotteries,
i.e. sign, with a rm, a contract that commits them to work a xed number
of hours, that we normalize to one, with probability Nt: Markets are com-
plete and the contract itself is traded, so a household gets paid whether it
works or not. Through this mechanism rms are able to provide complete
unemployment insurance to the workers. Since all households are identi-
cal, all will choose the same contract, i.e. the same Nt: However, although
households are ex-ante identical, they will di¤er ex-post depending on the
outcome of the lottery: a fraction Nt of the continuum of households will
work and the rest 1 Nt remains unemployed. The allocation of individuals
to work or leisure is determined completely at random by the lottery, and
lottery outcomes are independent over time.
Before the lottery draw, the expected intratemporal utility function is:
1
1  Nt [C0;t (0)]
1  +
1
1   (1 Nt) [C1;t (1)]
1  (1)
where C0;t is the consumption level of employed individuals, C1;t is the con-
sumption of unemployed individuals, Nt is the ex-ante probability of being
employed and  () is the utility of leisure. Since the utility of leisure of
employed individuals  (0) and the utility of leisure of unemployed individ-
uals  (1) are positive constants, we assume  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1: As in
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King and Rebelo [34], we assume 0 < 1: Under the assumption of complete
markets we obtain:
C 0;t 
1 
0 = C
 
1;t 
1 
1 (2)
so that the marginal utilities of consumption are equal for employed and
unemployed individuals. Dening the average consumption level as: Ct =
NtC0;t + (1 Nt)C1;t and given (2), equation (1) can be rewritten as:
1
1  C
1 
t

Nt
1 

0 + (1 Nt) 
1 

1

: (3)
This allows us to write the life-time expected intertemporal utility function
of a representative household as:
Ut = Et
1X
=t
 t
1
1   [Ct (Nt)]
1  ;  > 1; 0 <  < 1 (4)
 is the subjective discount rate, while  (Nt) =

Nt
1 

0 + (1 Nt) 
1 

1
 
1 
can be interpreted as the disutility of employment for the representative
household. The elasticity of  (Nt) with respect to its argument is given
by  =
N (Nt)
(Nt)
N < 0. The ow budget constraint of the representative
household is given by:
PtCt +R
 1
t Bt WtNt +Bt 1 +t   Tt (5)
where Pt is the corresponding consumption price index (CPI) and Wt is the
wage rate. Notice that here a worker is paid according to the probability
that it works, not according to the work it does; in other words, the rm is
automatically providing full employment insurance to the households. The
purchase of consumption goods, Ct; is nanced by labor income, prot in-
come t; and a lump-sum transfers Tt from the Government. We denote
by Bt the quantity of nominally riskless one period bonds carried over from
period t  1; and paying one unit of the numéraire in period t.8 The maxi-
mization of (4) subject to (5) gives:
1 = RtEt
"
Ct+1
Ct
   (Nt+1)
 (Nt)
1  Pt
Pt+1
#
(6)
Wt
Pt
=  CtN (Nt)
 (Nt)
(7)
where equation (6) is the standard consumption Euler equation and (7) gives
us the supply of labor of the representative household.
8As is standard in New Keynesian models, government bonds are introduced here as
a simple way to allow for the existence of a nominal interest rate in the economy, which
will be the policy instrument of the Central Bank.
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2.2 The Finished Goods-Producing Sector
The representative nished goods-producing rm uses Yt (j) units of each
intermediate good j 2 [0; 1] purchased at a nominal price Pt (j) to produce
Yt units of the nished good with the constant returns to scale technology:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
(8)
where  is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. Prot
maximization yields the following set of demands for intermediate goods:
Yt (j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 
Yt; where Pt =
hR 1
0 Pt (j)
1 
i 1
1 
is the aggregate price
index.
2.3 The Intermediate Goods-Producing Sector
We abstract from capital accumulation and assume that there is a contin-
uum of intermediate good-producing rms j 2 (0; 1) which hire Nt (j) units
of labor from the representative household and produce Yt (j) units of the
intermediate good using the following technology:
Yt (j) = AtNt (j)
 (9)
where At is an exogenous productivity shock. We assume that lnAt  at
follows the autoregressive process
at = aat 1 + a^t (10)
where a < 1 and a^t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innova-
tion with zero mean and standard deviation a. Before choosing the price of
its goods, a rm chooses the level of Nt (j) which minimizes its total costs,
TCt = (1  )WtNt (j) subject to (9), where  represents an employment
subsidy to the rm9. The rst order condition with respect to Nt (j) is given
by:
(1  )Wt
Pt
=MCt (j)
Yt (j)
Nt (j)
; (11)
where MCt (j) represent rms j real marginal costs.10 The aggregate real
marginal costs are dened as:
MCt =
(1  )

Wt
Pt
Nt
Yt
, (12)
and therefore MCt =MCt (j)
Yt(j)
Nt(j)
Nt
Yt
:
9We assume that the subsidy is covered by a lump sum tax in that the Government
runs always a balanced budget.
10The assumption of decreasing return to scale technology, which is in line with a non-
competitive intermediate good sector, has important implication on the optimal price-
settings rule, and then on the derivation of the traditional Phillips curve. See appendix
A5.
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2.4 Market clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market of sector j requires that the production of
the nal good be allocated to expenditure, so that Yt (j) = Ct (j) : In aggre-
gate terms it implies that Yt = Ct; which represents the economy resource
constraint. As standard, its log-linearization around the e¢ cient steady
state implies,
yt = ct (13)
Since the net supply of bonds, in equilibrium is zero, we have that Bt = 0:
Labor market clearing implies Nt =
R 1
0 Nt (j) dj: The aggregate production
function is instead given by, DtYt = AtNt , where Dt =
R 1
0

Pt(j)
Pt
  

dj

is a measure of price dispersion. Given that in a neighborhood of a sym-
metric equilibrium and up to a rst order approximation Dt ' 1; the log-
linearized aggregate production function can be expressed as,
yt = at + nt: (14)
2.5 The First Best Level of Output
The e¢ cient level of output can be obtained by solving the problem of a
benevolent planner that maximizes the intertemporal utility of the repre-
sentative household, subject to the resource constraint and the production
function. This problem is analyzed in the Appendix A1, where we show
that the e¢ cient supply of labor, in our economy, is given by:
N (Nt)
 (Nt)
Nt =  : (15)
Log-linearizing (15), and considering (14), we obtain11
yEfft = at: (16)
2.6 The Flexible Price Equilibrium and the Natural Output
Equilibrium in the labor market is obtained by equating (7) and (12).
 YtN (Nt)
 (Nt)
=
1
(1  )MCt
Yt
Nt
(17)
where we have considered that Ct = Yt: Under exible prices, all rms set
their prices equal to a constant markup over marginal cost. Assuming that
rms mark-up, Pt is constant, under the exible price-equilibrium rms real
11See appendix A2.
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marginal costs are constant at their steady state level and therefore given
by MCt = 11+P : Considering now the log-linearization of (17) we obtain
12,
mct =

1 +
N (N)
 (N)
N   NN (N)N
2
 (N)

nt (18)
Considering that mct = 0;then nt = 0 and, from the aggregate production
function, we have that under the exible price equilibrium:
yft = at (19)
Taking the di¤erence between the log-linearized exible and e¢ cient output
we obtain:
yEfft   yft = 0 (20)
As in the standard NKmodel, when labor market is frictionless the di¤erence
between the e¢ cient output (its rst best) coincides with its exible price
equilibrium level (its second best) that we have dened as the natural level
of output. In other words, what Blanchard and Galì [6] call the divine
coincidence will hold, since any policy that stabilizes output around its
natural level, will stabilize it also around its e¢ cient level.
2.7 The Phillips Curve
Firms choose Pt (j) in a staggered price setting à la Calvo-Yun [8]. In the
appendix A5 we show that, in our decreasing return to scale economy, the
solution of the rms problem is given by:
t = Ett+1 + mct (21)
where  =
(1  )(1  )
 

+(1 ) and  is the probability with which rms
reset prices.13
Given (14), (18) and (19), marginal costs can be rewritten in terms of the
gap between actual and natural output,
mct =

1 +
N (N)
 (N)
N   NN (N)N
2
 (N)

yt   yft

(22)
so that, equation (21) can be rewritten as,
t = Ett+1 + a

1 +
N (N)
 (N)
N   NN (N)N
2
 (N)

xt (23)
12See appendix A3.
13 It is worth noticing that because of decreasing returns technology the output gap
coe¢ cient, a; of the NK Phillips curve, is lower than the traditional coe¢ cient found
with constant return to scale. This means that the elasticity of ination to output gap is
lower than in the case of constant returns, which is consistent with the empirical estimates.
In fact, ination does not seems to respond strongly to the output gap. See for example
Galì et al ([31]) and Sbordone ([49]) for a more exaustive explanation.
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where
xt = yt   yft (24)
is the output gap with respect to the natural rate of output. As in the
standard case there is no trade-o¤between output stabilization and ination
stabilization, since a central bank that sets ination to zero will immediately
stabilize output.
3 The Monopoly Union Model
As in the previous subsection the individual labor supply is indivisible. Each
rm is endowed with a pool of households from which it can hire. In fact, as
in Ma¤ezzoli [39] and Zanetti [58], rms hire workers from a pool composed
of innitely many households so that the individual household member is
again of measure zero. Since each household supplies its labor to only one
rm, which can be clearly identied, workers try to extract some producer
surplus by organizing themselves into a rm-specic trade union. The econ-
omy is populated by decentralized trade unions, so that each intermediate
goods-producing rm negotiates with a single union i 2 (0; 1) which is too
small to inuence the outcome of the market. Unions negotiate the wage on
behalf of their members.
Once unions are introduced in the analysis, two important issues arise:
what is the objective function of the union and what are the variables sub-
ject to bargaining. Both these questions have been extensively investigated
by the literature, although no conclusive agreement has been reached on the
issue.14 The problem of identifying an appropriate maximand for the union
dates back to Dunlop [19] and Ross [48]; since then the debate has revolved
over the relative importance of economic considerations (basically how em-
ployers respond to wage bargaining) and political considerations in the de-
termination of union wage policy. For political considerations we intend
how the preferences of workers, the preference of union leaders and mar-
ket constraints interact in determining a unions objective. One approach
often followed in the literature is the utilitarian approach pioneered by
Oswald [41] which consists on assuming that all workers are equal and that
the union simply maximizes the sum of workersutility, dened over wages.
An alternative approach , initially proposed by Dertouzos and Pencavel [17]
and Pencavel [42] and, more recently, reproposed by De la Croix et al. [16]
and Raurich and Sorolla [45], is to assume that unions maximize a modied
Stone-Geary utility function of the form:
V

Wt (i)
Pt
; Nt (i)

=

Wt (i)
Pt
  W
r
t (i)
Pt

Nt (i)
& (25)
14For a survey of unions model see Farber [20], and, more recently, Kaufman [33].
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The relative value of  and & is an indicator of the relative importance of
wages and employment in in the unions objective function.15 The reserva-
tion wage W rt (i) is the absolute minimum wage the union i can tolerate.
This reservation wage has many possible interpretations. One possible inter-
pretation is thatW rt is the opportunity wage of the workers (Pencavel 1984)
since it is unlikely that a union can survive if it negotiates a wage below
such level. Another possible interpretation is that W rt is what Blanchard
and Katz [5] dene as an aspiration wage, i.e. a wage that workers have
come to regard as fair. Unionsreservation wage is generally unobservable
and therefore hard to model. As in De la Croix16 [16], however, we assume
that:
W rt (i)
Pt
= $e"
w
t (26)
where $ > 0 is a positive constant and with
"wt = w"
w
t 1 + "^
w
t (27)
where w < 1 and "
w
t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innova-
tion with zero mean and standard deviation w. If the real reservation wage
is constant, "^wt = 0: The fact that the reservation wage is subject to persis-
tent shocks is meant to capture the exogenous wage shocks, often associated
with political and social factors that have often characterized industrialized
economies, especially in Europe.17
The Stone-Geary utility function not only is appealing, both for its abil-
ity to approximate the actual behavior of unions and for its exibility and
tractability, but also for its generality. The parameters  and & correspond to
the elasticities of the unions objective V () to the excess wage Wt(i)Pt  
W rt (i)
Pt
and to the employment level Nt (i) respectively. The larger the di¤erence
&   , the more the union approaches the extreme of a democratic (or
populist) union. When & = , these two parties have an identical discre-
tionary power in formulating policies. If unions are wage oriented then
 > &; on the other hand if they are employment oriented < &. If we
15Our objective function is closed to the one suggested by the Ross tradition. In fact,
for di¤erent parameters values, the unions objective function is almost equivalent to the
one of a union which maximizes his income or his membership, as for example in Skatun
[50] and in Booth [4].
16 In the model of De la Croix et al. [16] the real reservation wage is a weighted sum of
a constant term and of the past real wage. In order not to add further ad-hockery to the
model, we chose not to include past real wages. Nevertheless adding these to equation
(26) would leave the results unchanged. A technical appendix is avalable upon request.
17We consider both these two alternative in order to show that the our results on the
endogenous ination unemployment (output) trade-o¤ is not qualitatively inuenced by
the fact that the reservation wage shock is an exogenous shock. Moreover, to our knowledge
this is the rst attempt to study how the optimal interest rate rule should react in response
to more than one supply shock.
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set  = 1; & = 1 and "^wt = 0, maximizing (25) is equivalent to maximize
the unionsobjective function assumed by Ma¤ezzoli [39] and Zanetti [58] in
their recent papers. The bargaining process we consider here is in the tradi-
tion of the right to managemodels. In particular, we follow the popular
monopoly unionmodel rst proposed by [19] and Oswald [41], where the
employment rate and the wage rate are determined in a non-cooperative dy-
namic game between unions and rms. We restrict the attention to Markov
strategies, so that in each period unions and rms solve a sequence of in-
dependent static games. Each union behaves as a Stackelberg leader and
each rm as a Stackelberg follower. Once the wage has been chosen, each
rm decides the employment rate along its labor demand function. Even
if unions are large at the rm level, they are small at the economy level,
and therefore they take the aggregate wage as given. The ex-ante proba-
bility of being employed is equal to the aggregate employment rate and the
allocation of union members to work or leisure is completely random and
independent over time. Finally, as in the previous IL economy, we assume
that workers are able to perfectly insure themselves against the possibility
of being unemployed. This result can either be obtained through the lottery
mechanism previously described or by assuming, as in Ma¤ezzoli [39] and
Zanetti [58] that, in order to impede workers from leaving the Union, the
Union pursues a redistributive goal, acting as a substitute for competitive
insurance market. Insurance is supplied under zero-prot condition and is
therefore actuarially fair. The problem of the rm is the same as in the IL
model.
From the rst order conditions of the unions maximization problem
with respect to Wt (i) ; given that in this model the labor demand elasticity
with respect to the real wage 11  is constant, after imposing the symmetric
equilibrium we obtain:
Wt
Pt
=
&
&   (1  )
W rt
Pt
: (28)
with & > (1 ): The technology shock has no e¤ect on the real wage rate
chosen by the monopoly union. Since && (1 ) > 1; we see that the real
wage rate is always set above the reservation wage.
It is interesting to compare, at this point, equation (28) with the real wage
equation we would obtain if the union simply maximized agentsutility (4)
subject to a rms labor demand (11). In this case the real wage would be
given by
Wt
Pt
=   1

Ct
N (Nt)
 (Nt)
(29)
where 1 > 1 is the mark-up over the competitive real wage (7) a monopoly
union would be able to capture. Notice that when unions maximize the
objective function (25), real wages are always set above the reservation wage
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and vary only in response to changes in the reservation wage so that we have
real wage rigidity. When unions simply maximize workersutility real wages
are instead fully exible.
3.1 Households
If the union o¤ers actuarially fair insurance, household will again perfectly
share the risk to be unemployed. The model is quite similar to the IL model
except for the fact that now households, in solving their problem, take Nt as
given, since their wage schedule is determined by the maximization problem
of the monopoly union. The maximization of utility function (4) subject
to budget constraint (5) gives the same Euler equation as in the Walrasian
model, which is given by equation (6).
3.2 The Flexible Price Equilibrium and the Natural Level of
Output
Given that both intermediate goods and nished goods producing rm prob-
lem are the same as in the previous problem, the aggregate labor demand
function is again given by equation (12). Labor market equilibrium therefore
implies,
1

W rt
Pt
=
1
(1  )MCt
Yt
Nt
; (30)
also in this case  guarantees that the MU model steady state is equal to the
pareto-e¢ cient one. Considering now the log-linearization of (30), together
with nt = yt  at we obtain the following expression for real marginal costs,
mct = "
w
t +
1  

yt   1

at: (31)
Considering that mct = 0; substituting in (31) and solving for yt we nd
an expression for the exible-price level of output, which we dene as the
natural rate of output for our unionized economy:
yft =
1
1  at  

1  "
w
t (32)
Recalling now that the e¢ cient level of output, for our economy with indivis-
ible labor, is given by equation (16) we immediately see that the di¤erence
between natural output and e¢ cient output of the unionized economy is
given by
yEfft   yft =  

1  at +

1  "
w
t : (33)
Unlike what happens in the walrasian model, this di¤erence is not constant,
but is a function of the relevant shocks that hit the economy. In this model
therefore, stabilizing the output gap - the di¤erence between actual and
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natural output - is not equivalent to stabilizing the welfare relevant output
gap - the gap between actual and e¢ cient output. In other words, what
Blanchard and Galì call the divine coincidence will not hold, since any
policy that brings the economy to its natural level is not necessarily an
optimal policy.18
3.3 The IS-Curve
To obtain an IS curve we log-linearize the Euler equation (6) as:
ct = Et fct+1g   1  

N (N)N
 (N)
Et fnt+1g   1

(r^t   Et ft+1g) (34)
with r^t = rt  %; where rt = lnRt and % =   ln which is the steady state
interest rate all the variables without a subscript are taken at their steady
state levels. Given that optimal subsidy setting implies N (N)N(N) =  ; we
rewrite equation (34) as,
ct = Et fct+1g+  (1  )

Et fnt+1g   1

(r^t   Et ft+1g) : (35)
Given the economy resource constraint (13), the production function (14),
and the denition of the output gap xt = yt  yEfft , the Euler equation (35)
becomes:
xt = Etxt+1 + Et fat+1g   (r^t   Et ft+1g) :
The e¢ cient rate of interest, instead, can be expressed as, r^et =   (1  a) at:
Therefore, the IS relation can be rewritten as:
xt = Et fxt+1g   (r^t   Et ft+1g   ret ) : (36)
Note that (36) relates the output gap rate to current and anticipated devi-
ations of the real interest rate from its e¢ cient counterpart.
3.4 The Phillips Curve
As in the walrasian case, rms choose Pt (j) in a staggered price setting à la
Calvo-Yun [8] and the Phillips curve is again given by (21). Given (31) and
(32), marginal costs can be rewritten in terms of the gap between actual
output and its natural level,
mct =
1  


yt   yft

(37)
so that, equation (21) can now be rewritten as,
t = Ett+1 + a
1  


yt   yft

(38)
18 It is worth noticing that even if the real reservation wage is constant, the exible price
equilibrium output is di¤erent from the e¢ cient one.
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Given the relationship between e¢ cient and natural output, (see eq. (33)),
equation (38) can nally be expressed as:
t = Ett+1 + a
1  

xt   aat + a"wt (39)
We can now state:
Result 1. In a unionized labor market economy the divine coincidence
does not hold, i.e., stabilizing ination is not equivalent to stabilizing the
output gap dened as the deviation of output from the e¢ cient output. A
positive (negative) productivity shock has a negative (positive) e¤ect on
ination, while a cost push shock has an e¤ect of the same size but with the
opposite sign on ination.
This result depends on the existence of a real distortion in the economy,
beside the one induced by monopolistic competition, and the nominal dis-
tortion caused by rmsstaggered price setting. When a productivity shock
hits the economy, e¢ cient output, given by equation (16), increases by the
same amount. Natural output instead (i.e., the level of output that would
prevail in a exible price equilibrium) increases more than proportionally so
that the di¤erence between e¢ cient output and natural output decreases.
This is due to the fact that in a unionized economy, following a productivity
shock, real wages remain constant and therefore do not o¤set the e¤ects of
the shock on real marginal cost (see equation (37)). Because of staggered
price adjustment we know that ination is proportional to real marginal costs
which, in turn, because of monopolistic competition (see equation (38)) are
proportional to the di¤erence between actual and natural output. As we
will see in the following paragraphs, a Central Bank pursuing an optimal
monetary policy will decide to stabilize the distance between output and
its e¢ cient level. If the di¤erence between e¢ cient and exible output were
constant, as in the standard model with Walrasian labor markets, stabilizing
the gap between actual and natural output would be equivalent to stabiliz-
ing the gap between actual and e¢ cient output. In this case, stabilizing the
output gap with respect to the natural output would be su¢ cient to stabi-
lize ination. In our unionized economy, instead, the natural level of output
di¤ers from the e¢ cient level because of productivity and cost-push shocks.
As it is evident from equation (39), if the Central Bank stabilizes output
around the e¢ cient level, ination will be completely vulnerable to produc-
tivity and cost-push shocks; in other words the output gap is no longer a
su¢ cient statistics for the e¤ect of real activity on ination. Note that if the
union maximized householdsutility and real wages were given by equation
(29), the log-linearized exible price equilibrium output would coincide with
(19), i.e. the exible price equilibrium output obtained in the IL model with
walrasian labor markets. Therefore, the divine coincidence would still hold.
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One interesting aspect of this model is that we are able to express the
Phillips curve in its more traditional form, i.e. in terms of unemployment.
From equations (14), (16) and (24) we nd that nt = xt : Expressing the
rate of unemployment as Ut = 1 Nt and log linearizing around the steady
state we obtain ut =   xt; where  = N1 N : We can therefore rewrite the
Philllips curve as:
t = Ett+1   a(1  )

ut   aat + a"wt : (40)
The relationship between unemployment and the output gap that we nd
in this model, therefore, allows us to consider, indi¤erently, the output gap
and the unemployment rate as policy objectives for the central bank.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
In Appendix A6 we show that also for the non-separable preferences assumed
in our framework, consumersutility can be approximated up to the second
order by a quadratic equation of the kind:
Wt = Et
1X
t=0
t ~Ut+k =  UY;t
2
Et
1X
t=0
t

2H;t+k +
a

x2t+k

+

kk3

(41)
where ~Ut+k = Ut+k   Ut+k is the deviation of consumersutility from the
level achievable in the frictionless equilibrium, and  is the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods, which are used as input in the nal
good sector. Notice that, the relative weights assigned to ination and to
the output gap are linked to the structural parameters reecting preferences
and technology. We will consider optimal monetary policy under discretion,
i.e. when the Central Bank cannot credibly commit in advance to a future
policy action or a sequence of future policy actions.19 Policy makers choose
in each period the value to assign to the policy instrument, i.e., the short-
term nominal interest rate r^t. In order to do so, the Central Bank maximizes
the welfare-based loss function (41), subject to the Phillips curve (39), and
(36). The rst order conditions imply:
xt =  1  

t: (42)
Substituting into (39) and iterating forward,
t =  a


Et
1X
i=0




i  
at+i   "wt+i

(43)
19The case of constrained commitment, i.e. when the Central Bank is committed to
follow a well specied policy rule, is analyzed in a separate appendix avalaible upon
request.
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where 
 = 1 + 
 
1 

2
: The interest rate rule can be obtained by sub-
stituting (42), (43) and (43) one period ahead, into the IS curve (36), we
obtain:
r^t =  

1 +

1  a
a

1  




aa

  a

+  (1  a)

at+
+

1 +

1  w
w

1  




aw

  w

"wt (44)
We can therefore state
Result 2. Under discretion an optimal monetary policy requires a decrease
in the nominal interest rate following a positive productivity shock and an
increase in the nominal interest rate following a positive reservation wage
shock.
An interest rate rule that implements such optimal policy, can be found
using (42), iterating forward (43) and remembering that Et fat+i+1g = iaat
and that Et

"wt+i+1
	
= iw"
w
t we obtain:
r^t =

1 +

1  w
w

1  



Ett+1+

1 +
(w   a)
w (1  a)
a

  a
1  


r^et :
(45)
Assuming, as a particular case a = w = ; equation (45) becomes
r^t =

1 +

1  


1  



Ett+1 + r
e
t (46)
which is equivalent on assuming that the real reservation wage "^wt = 0: We
can now state:
Result 3. Optimal monetary policy under discretion requires a more than
proportional increase in the nominal interest rate following an increase in
the expected rate of ination. However, an increase in the e¢ cient rate of
interest implies a proportional increase in the nominal interest rate if and
only if a = w = 1. Otherwise an increase in the e¢ cient rate implies a
more than proportional increase in the nominal interest rate if w > a and
a less than proportional increase if w < a:
As in the standard NK model, optimality requires that the Central Bank
responds to increasing inationary expectations by raising more than pro-
portionally nominal interest rates. In other words, also for our unionized
economy, the Taylor principle applies. The optimal response of the nomi-
nal interest rate to an increase in the e¢ cient rate of interest, instead, is
di¤erent from the one that is usually obtained in the standardNK model.
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Notice that (39) together with ut =   xt imply,
ut =  (1  )a
2(
  a)
at +
(1  )a
2(
  w)
"wt : (47)
Given the log-linearization of equation (28), we can now state
Result 4. Under an optimal discretionary monetary policy a productivity
shock will induce a change in the rate of unemployment without a¤ecting the
real wage rate.
This result is quite important since it is consistent with a well known fact
in macroeconomics, i.e. the relatively smooth behavior of wages along the
business cycle together with the relatively volatile behavior of unemploy-
ment. In this simple model, wages move only when there is a shock in the
reservation wages of households. Productivity shocks imply some degree of
volatility in unemployment while real wages remain constant. Wages, in the
simple set up we consider in this paper, are probably too rigid, as we assume
that all markets are unionized. Nevertheless, the model makes an interesting
point, i.e. that the behavior of monopoly unions, in itself, is able to generate
a dynamics of wages and unemployment that is roughly consistent with the
one typically observed in the real economy.
5 Calibration
Our calibration exercise is aimed at illustrating the qualitative properties of
our model. We start by comparing our economy characterized by staggered
prices and real wage rigidity with an economy characterized by exible prices
and real wage rigidity under the interest rate rule estimated by Smets and
Wouters [57] for the Euro area. The purpose of this exercise is to obtain
a better understanding of the role of real wage rigidity in the transmission
of monetary policy. Using the same interest rule, in a second step, we
compare the dynamics of the unionized economy with the dynamics of an
economy with a walrasian labor market. A similar exercise can be found
also in Zanetti [58]. Di¤erently from Zanettis model, ours does not allow for
human and physical capital accumulation and this allows us to study optimal
monetary policy and provide, therefore, a useful benchmark to evaluate
actual monetary policy. In a third step, we calibrate the model under the
optimal monetary policy rule and we look for a simple rule that can actually
replicate such policy. As in Zanetti [58], the variables of the model are
calibrated using data from the Euro area.
The model is calibrated on quarterly frequencies. For the parameters
describing preferences, we set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at
 = 2: The output elasticity of labor,  = 0:72; is based on the estimate of
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Christo¤el et al. [15]. We set  = 0:99; ' = 0:75; which implies an average
price duration of one year, and nally  = 6; which is consistent with a 10
percent markup in the steady state. The persistence of the technology shock
is set to a = 0:93 as in Amato and Laubach [3]. The persistence of the wage
shock is assumed to be equal to w = 0:7; as the persistence of a cost-push
shock estimated by Ireland [36]. As discussed in Zanetti [58] N = 0:61:
In the rst and in the second exercise, the Central Bank is assumed to
follow the following Taylor-type monetary policy rule:
r^t = rr^t 1 + (1  r) [t 1 + xxt 1] (48)
As advocated by Carlstrom and Fuerst [9], we employ lagged values for
output and ination because it can be considered consistent with the infor-
mation set of the Central Bank at time t. The parameters of the Taylor
rule follow the estimates of Smets and Wouters [57] for the Euro area. In
particular, the degree of interest rate smoothing is set at r = 0:9; the nom-
inal interest rate response to ination at  = 1:658 and the response to
output at x = 0:148:
Figure 1 shows a comparison between the IRFs to a negative productiv-
ity shock in an economy with real wage rigidity and exible prices (dashed
line) and in our economy characterized by real wage rigidity and staggered
prices (solid line). In both cases the presence of real wage rigidity introduces
a trade-o¤ between ination and output stabilization: ination goes up and
output decreases, the nominal interests rate increases more than proportion-
ately with respect to the ination rate. It is worth noticing, however, that
if prices are fully exible all variables are much more volatile. Moreover, in
the staggered price economy unemployment decreases and the output gap
increases, whereas, in the exible price economy we have the opposite result:
unemployment increases and the output gap decreases. The intuition is the
following. In both cases, unless a reservation wage shock hits the economy,
unions tend to keep real wages constant. This means that the negative
e¤ect on marginal costs caused by a decrease in productivity is not par-
tially o¤set by a reduction in real wages. Nominal marginal costs increase.
Given that in the exible price economy prices are always set as a constant
markup over nominal marginal costs, rms increase prices immediately by
the same amount of the increase in nominal marginal costs. Consequently,
ination increases and, given the type of Taylor rule we have assumed, the
nominal interest rate goes up more than proportionally. Then, consumption
decreases and aggregate demand goes down. Given that rms cannot ad-
just real wages they are forced to reduce their demand for labor. Therefore,
unemployment increases. As shown in gure 1 unemployment increases by
about 6 percentage points.
On the contrary, when prices are staggered, only a proportion of rms ad-
just their prices immediately, while the others leave their prices unchanged.
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This means that ination increases less than in the exible price economy.
Therefore the nominal interest rate increases less. Consequently, the reduc-
tion of aggregate demand is lower than the reduction in productivity. This
means that, in order to satisfy the aggregate demand rms need to hire new
workers. In this case unemployment decreases, instead of increasing. In fact,
as shown in gure 1 unemployment decreases by almost 2% points.
In the second exercise we evaluate the dynamics of the walrasian model
and the dynamics of the unionized model in response to a negative produc-
tivity shock. In gure (2) we plot the response of the interest rate, ination,
output, the output gap and unemployment to a one unit standard devia-
tion negative productivity shock in the unionized economy (solid line) and
in the walrasian labor market economy (dashed line). Our model, although
simpler, produces results that are very similar to the ones found by Zanetti
[58]. This suggests that adding physical and human capital accumulation
does not sensibly change the dynamics of the model.
A negative productivity shock, in both the walrasian and the unionized
economies, causes the output gap to rise, total output to decline, the nom-
inal interest rate and ination to rise and unemployment (employment) to
decline (rise). The di¤erence between the responses of the walrasian and
the unionized economies lies not on the sign of the e¤ect, but on the size
of the e¤ect: in the unionized economy the response of the main variables
to a productivity shock is amplied and all the variables in the unionized
economy are characterized by a higher degree of persistence.
The fact that unemployment experiences a large decline after a nega-
tive productivity shock, as shown in gure (2), is extremely interesting. A
negative comovement between productivity shocks and various measures of
the labor input has been recently found in the empirical literature, among
others, by Galì [23], [27], [29], and by Francis et al. [22] [21].20. This empir-
ical result has given rise to an important debate21, since the standard RBC
model is not able to replicate it, and has been used to cast serious doubts on
the relevance of productivity shocks in explaining business uctuations. In
contrast, our model seems to suggest that technology shocks might still be
a driving force of the business cycle if the economy is characterized by labor
indivisibilities and sticky prices and the central bank follows a Taylor-type
rule.
This formulation of our model provides a direct comparison with the
Blanchard Galì [7] model, characterized by search frictions and real wage
rigidity. In that model, when monetary policy follows the simple rule pro-
posed by Taylor [51], which is in turn used to approximate the optimal
interest rate rule, the correlation between productivity and unemployment
20See Galì and Rabanal [26] for a survey.
21For alternative estimations of the e¤ect of productivity shocks on the labor input see
Christiano et al. [13].
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is negative. Di¤erently from ours, the Blanchard Galì [7] model is not able
to replicate the empirical ndings of Galì [23], [27], [29] and others.
In gure (3) we describe the response of the main variables of the union-
ized model under the optimal discretionary rule (45). In this case a one
standard deviation negative productivity shock requires a 0.3% initial in-
crease in the nominal interest rate of 0.3% and an increase in ination of
almost 0.13%. Initially output gap falls by 1% and the rate of unemployment
has an initial increase of about 2 percentage points, while output decrease by
2%. An optimal monetary policy, therefore, will take into account the trade-
o¤ that exists between ination stabilization and output stabilization and
will require some degree of accommodation: as a response to a productivity
shock output will decrease and ination will increase.
In order to evaluate to what extent Taylor rules found in the empirical
literature on monetary policy compare relatively to the optimal monetary
policy analyzed in this paper, we report, in gure (4), the results of an
exercise aimed at replicating the optimal policy through a simple Taylor rule.
We found that a rule that approximates quite well the optimal monetary
policy (i.e. that achieves a response of the major variables quite close to
the one achieved by our economy under the optimal discretional monetary
policy) is given by,
it = 2:5t + 0:05xt (49)
Notice that this rule implies a stronger response to ination and a weaker
response to the output gap than the ones found in the literature. It is also
worth noticing that, di¤erently from what happens under the Taylor rules
considered above, under the optimal policy rule negative productivity shocks
have a negative e¤ect on unemployment. This result, together with the one
described in gures (2), (3) and (4), suggests that the negative correlation
between productivity and employment found in the data by Galì and others
might be the result of a monetary policy too accommodating with respect
to ination, rather than consequence of some structuralcharacteristic of
the economy.
In gures (5) and (6) we show the responses of the interest rate, output
and unemployment to a one standard deviation shock to the reservation
wage under the optimal rule and under the rule which mimic the optimal
one. The responses are similar to the ones found for the productivity shocks,
although, in the case of wage push shocks, the correlation between output
and unemployment is always negative.
6 Conclusions
We have considered a DSGE-NK model where labor is indivisible and where
wages are set by monopoly unions. We found that, with respect to the
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standard NK framework, our model gives a more satisfactory description
of the reality of modern industrialized economies, especially of those where
collective bargaining dominates the labor market. In a unionized economy,
signicant trade-o¤s between stabilizing ination and stabilizing unemploy-
ment arise in response to technology and exogenous wage shocks. Because
of real wage rigidity, an optimizing central bank must respond to negative
technology shocks by increasing the interest rate and, similarly, must re-
spond to exogenous increases in unionsreservation wage with an interest
rate increase. Interestingly, if we consider an optimal instrument rule, an
optimizing central bank not only will increase the interest rate more than
proportionately in response to an increase in future expected ination, but
will also react to increases in the natural rate that are not necessarily one
to one. The model is also capable of accounting for the greater volatility
of unemployment relative to the wage volatility that is usually found in the
data. Moreover, once calibrated on Euro-area parameters, with the addi-
tion of an exogenous interest rate rule, our model is consistent with the
positive correlation between technology shocks and the labor input found
in the data. This correlation, however, becomes negative once the optimal
discretionary rule is included in the model, suggesting that this correlation
might be explained by the nature of monetary policy.
Even though, for the sake of simplicity, many other market imperfections,
like search and matching frictions and ring costs are absent from our model,
and therefore only some of the characteristics of European labor markets
are taken into account, the model provides a coherent framework for the
analysis of monetary policy in countries where unions play an important
role. Obviously, there are many possible extensions to this model that could
provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between monetary policy
and di¤erent institutional settings in the labor market; we leave however
these challenges to future research.
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A Technical Appendix
A.1 The Ramsey Problem
We consider a social planner which maximizes the representative household utility
subject to the economy resource constraint and production function as follows:
max
Nt
U (Ct; Nt) =
1
1  C
1 
t  (Nt)
1  (A1)
subject to the economy resource constraint and to the aggregate production func-
tion. The rst order condition requires
(AtN

t )
  
Yt
Nt
 (Nt)
1  =   (AtNt )1   (Nt)  N (Nt) (A2)
simplifying
Yt
N (Nt)
 (Nt)
=   Yt
Nt
(A3)
Multiplying both sides of equation for NtYt we nd equation (15) in the text.
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A.2 Derivation of the E¢ cient Output
We consider the Ramsey solution (A4)
N (Nt)Nt =   (Nt) (A4)
in order to nd an equation for the e¢ cient output we rst log-linearizing equation
(A5) around the steady state, which implies
[N (N) + NN (N)Nnt]N (1 + nt) =   ( (N) + N (N)Nnt) : (A5)
Considering the steady state equation, i.e. that N (N)N =   (N) and col-
lecting terms in nt we obtain: 
1 +
N (N)Nt
 (N)
+
NN (N)N
2
 (N)

N (N)Nt
 (N)
 1!
nt = 0 (A6)
given that 1 + N (N)Nt(N) +
NN (N)N
2
(N)

N (N)Nt
(N)
 1 6= 0 we require nt = 0, and
then from the aggregate production function we obtain equation (16) in the text.
A.3 Derivation of the Flexible Price Equilibrium Output in the IL
Model
Let us rewrite equation (17) as:
N (Nt)Nt =  

(1  )MCt (Nt) ; (A7)
then log-linearizing,
[N (N) + NN (N)Nnt]N (1 + nt) =  
MC
(1  ) (1 +mct) [ (N) + N (N)Nnt]
(A8)
considering the steady state of equation (A7) we have,
mct =

1 +
N (N)N
 (N)
+
NN (N)N
2
 (N)

nt (A9)
given that in the exible price equilibrium it must hold that mct = 0; as in
the previous problem it requires that nt = 0: Then, considering the aggregate
production function we obtain equation (19) in the text.
A.4 Derivation of the Phillips Curve
Following Calvo [8] we assume that each rm may reset its price with probability
1  ' each period, independently from the time elapsed since the last adjustment.
This means that each period a measure 1   ' of rms reset their price, while a
fraction ' of them keep their price unchanged.
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The law of motion of the aggregate price is given by: lnPt = ' lnPt 1+(1  ') lnP t ,
which implies
t = (1  ') ln

pt
Pt 1

(A10)
where lnP t denotes the (log) price set by a rm i adjusting its price in period
t: Under Calvo [8] price-setting structure pt+k (i) = p

t with probability '
k for
k = 0; 1; 2; :::; hence rms have to be forward-looking.
Given that the individual rm technology is characterized by decreasing return to
scale, the optimal price setting rule should take into account that marginal cost
is no longer common across rms. In particular, in the neighborhood of the zero
ination steady state, we have the following price-setting rule:
lnP t (i) = 
P + (1  ')
1X
k=0
(')k Et

mcnt;t+k
	
(A11)
where mcnt;t+k is the log-linearized nominal marginal cost in period t+ k of a rm
which last set its price in period t: Considering the equation of real marginal cost
and the one of the aggregate production function,
MCt;t+k = (1  ) (Wt+k=Pt+k)
 (Yt;t+k=Nt;t+k)
=MCt+k

P t
Pt+k
 1 

(A12)
taking the logs
lnMCt;t+k = lnMCt+k   1  

ln

P t
Pt+k

(A13)
and considering that all rms resetting prices in period t will choose the same price
P t we can rewrite equation (A13) as,
ln

P t (i)
Pt 1

= P + (1  ')
1X
k=0
(')k Et

lnMCnt;t+k   lnPt 1
	
(A14)
which can be rewritten as
ln

P t (i)
Pt 1

= P + (1  ')
1X
k=0
(')k Et

lnMCnt;t+k   
1  

ln

P t
Pt+k

+
1X
k=0
(')k ft+kg (A15)
then
lnP t (i)  lnPt 1 = P +'Et

lnP t+1   lnPt
	
+(1  ') lnMCt; (A16)
which allows to obtain equation (21) in the text.
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A.5 The Welfare-Based Loss Function
A second-order Taylor expansion of the period utility around the e¢ cient equilib-
rium yields,
Ut = Ut + U C;t
Ct ~Ct +
1
2
U C C;t
C2t
~C2t +
U N;t
Nt ~Nt +
1
2
U N N;t
N2t
~N2t +
+ U C N;t
Ct Nt ~Ct ~Nt +

kk3

(A17)
where the generic ~X = ln
 
X= Xt

denotes log-deviations from the e¢ cient equilib-
rium and Xt denotes the value of the variable under e¢ cient equilibrium. Moreover,
we denote as xt = ln

Xt
X

: Considering the exible prices economy resource con-
straint,
Ut = Ut + U Y ;t
Yt ~Yt +
1
2
U Y Y ;t
Y 2t ~Y
2
t + U N;t
Nt ~Nt +
1
2
U N N;t
N2t ~N
2
t +
+U Y N;t
Yt Nt ~Yt ~Nt +

kk3

: (A18)
Collecting terms yields
Ut = Ut + U Y ;t
Yt
24 ~Yt + U N;t NtU Y ;t Yt ~Nt + 12 U Y Y ;tU Y ;t Yt ~Y 2t +
+12
U N N;t
N2t
U Y ;t
Yt
~N2t +
U Y N;t
Nt
U Y ;t
~Yt ~Nt
35+kk3 (A19)
Considering that,
U Y N;t
Nt
U Y ;t
=
 N;t( Nt) Nt
( Nt)
=   (1  ); we have,
Ut = Ut+ U Y ;t
Yt
2664
~Yt    ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t + (1  )
N( Nt)
( Nt)
Nt ~Yt ~Nt
+12
"
NN( Nt)
( Nt)
  

N( Nt)
( Nt)
2#
N2t ~N
2
t
3775+kk3
(A20)
It can be shown that
NN;t( Nt)
( Nt)
= 2 1

N( Nt)
( Nt)
2
; hence
Ut = Ut+ U Y ;t
Yt
2664
~Yt    ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t + (1  )
N( Nt)
( Nt)
Nt ~Yt ~Nt
+12
" 
2 1
   
N( Nt)
( Nt)
2#
N2t
~N2t
3775+kk3
(A21)
and therefore,
Ut = Ut + U Y ;t
Yt

~Yt    ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t   (1  ) ~Yt ~Nt+
+12
 
2 1
   

2 ~N2t

+

kk3

:
(A22)
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We now take a rst-order expansion of the term U Y ;t Yt around the steady state.
U Y ;t
Yt = UY

1 + (1  ) yt + (1  ) N (N)
 (N)
N nt

+

kk2

= UY (1 + (1  ) yt   (1  )nt) +

kk2

(A23)
with
N
 
Nt


 
Nt
 Nt = N (N)
 (N)
N +  nnt ++

kk2

(A24)
where  n =

N (N)N
(N) +
NN (N)N
2
(N)   N (N)
2N2
(N)2

; and
 
N
 
Nt

Nt

 
Nt
 !2 = N (N)N2
 (N)
2
+ nnt +

kk2

(A25)
where n = 2

N (N)NN (N)N
(N)2
+

N (N)N
(N)
2   N (N)(N) 3N
given that nt = 0; and that
N (N)N
(N) =  ; substituting (A24) and (A25) into the
welfare function,
Ut = Ut+UY (1 + (1  ) yt)

~Yt    ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t    (1  ) ~Yt ~Nt
+12
 
2 1
   

2 ~N2t

+

kk3

(A26)
Given the aggregate production function and that the log-deviations of the price dis-
persion index dt = ~Yt  ~Nt are of second-order, and that: ~Y 2t = 2 ~N2t nt ~Nt =
nt ~Yt yt ~Nt = yt ~Yt ~Yt ~Nt = ~Y
2
t . Considering only terms up to the
second-order we have:
Ut = Ut + UY

~Yt   ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t   (1  ) ~Y 2t
+12
 
2 1
   

~Y 2t

+

kk3

(A27)
or
~Ut  Ut   Ut =  UY

dt   1
2
~Y 2t

+

kk3

(A28)
As proven by Galì and Monacelli [28], the log-index of the relative-price distortion is
of second-order and proportional to the variance of prices across rms, which implies
that22 : dt = ln
R 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt

di

= 2vari
n
pt (i) +

kk3
o
. As shown in
Woodford [56], this means that:
1X
t=0
tvari fpt (i)g = 1a
1X
t=0
t2t , where  =
(1   ) (1   ) = : Finally, denoting the output gap ~Yt as in the standard way
xt; the Welfare-Based loss-function can be written as equation (41) in the text.
22Proof Galì and Monacelli [28].
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions to a 1 unit sd. negative productivity shock
under the Taylor rule esitimated by Smets and Wouters (2003). Comparison be-
tweens staggered prices (solid line) and exible prices (dashed line) economy.
Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a 1 unit sd. negative productivity
shock. Comparison between the walrasian labor market economy (dashed
line) and the unionized labor market economy (solid line).
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a 1 sd. negative productivity shock under
the optimal interest rate rule.
Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a 1 unit sd. negative productivity shock
under the simple rule that replicates the optimal one.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a 1 unit sd. positive reservation
wage shock under the optimal interest rate rule
Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a 1 unit sd. positive reservation wage
shock under the simple rule that replicates the optimal one.
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